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“We should make every effort to understand the new technology. We should 
take into account the possibility that developing technology may have im-
portant societal implications that will become apparent only with time. We 
should not jump to the conclusion that new technology is fundamentally the 
same as some older thing with which we are familiar. And we should not hasti-
ly dismiss the judgment of legislators, who may be in a better position than we 
are to assess the implications of new technology.”–Supreme Court Justice 
Samuel Alito1 
TABLE OF CONTENTS  
INTRODUCTION .............................................................................................  1016 
 I. WHY THIS MATTERS .........................................................................  1018 
 II. WHAT IS ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE? ...............................................  1023 
 A. The Development of Artificial Intelligence ...............................  1023 
 B. Computer Science Approaches to Artificial Intelligence ..........  1025 
 C. Autonomy ..................................................................................  1026 
 D. Strong AI & Weak AI ................................................................  1027 
 III. CURRENT STATE OF AI DEFINITIONS ................................................  1029 
 A. Black’s Law Dictionary ............................................................  1029 
 B. Nevada ......................................................................................  1030 
 C. Louisiana...................................................................................  1032 
 IV. METHODS FOR WRITING A GENERAL DEFINITION ............................  1033 
 A. Ambiguity & Descriptors ..........................................................  1036 
 B. Descriptive Definition ...............................................................  1037 
                                                        
*  J.D. Candidate, Spring 2019, William S. Boyd School of Law, University of Nevada, Las 
Vegas. The author would like to thank the Nevada Law Journal staff for their edits, the facul-
ty and staff at the William S. Boyd School of Law for their guidance, and Professor David 
McClure for his help in on this student note. 
1  Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 806 (2011) (Alito, J., concurring). 
19 NEV. L.J. 1015, MARTINEZ 5/28/2019  10:48 AM 
1016 NEVADA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 19:3  
 C. Prescriptive Definition ..............................................................  1038 
CONCLUSION ................................................................................................  1039 
 
INTRODUCTION 
When we say or hear the phrase “Artificial Intelligence” (or “AI”) various 
things can come to mind—images from robot armies trying to extinguish hu-
manity to less intimidating images of Alexa asking someone trivia questions. 
The phrase has become ubiquitous to describe countless forms of advanced 
technology.2 Colloquially using a term in this way can lead to general confu-
sion, but it can be far more damaging in a legal context. Unambiguous defini-
tions are critical in the application of the law, whether in determining if a burri-
to is a sandwich,3 or if a film is considered pornography.4 With the promise of 
efficiency and money, companies have begun pursuing artificial intelligence 
and investing copious amounts of money into its development.5 Governments 
and legislatures have certainly taken note, and some states have attempted to 
outline regulations for artificial intelligence.6 
There is a myriad of legal questions and problems that arise from the de-
velopment and implementation of artificial intelligence. However, without def-
initions, or at the very least a clear understanding of the concept, many re-
sources will be wasted on litigation and inept policy making.7 Certain states 
have acknowledged the presence of and attempted to define AI, either in terms 
of a specific function or by incorporating it into other definitions, but this only 
ends up skirting the question.8 Thus, there is no general legal definition for 
what constitutes AI outside of a specific application, such as in the context of 
autonomous automobiles or electronic agents trading in the markets.9 However, 
                                                        
2  See Cristiano Castelfranchi, Alan Turing’s “Computing Machinery and Intelligence”, 
SPRINGER SCI. & BUS. MEDIA DORDRECHT 293, 293 (2013); James Vincent, What Counts as 
Artificially Intelligent? AI and Deep Learning, Explained, VERGE (Feb. 29, 2016, 3:40 PM), 
http://www.theverge.com/2016/2/29/11133682/deep-learning-ai-explained-machine-learning 
[https://perma.cc/23V8-MJQE]. 
3  Associated Press, Massachusetts Judge Settles Dispute by Ruling Burrito is Not a Sand-
wich, FOX NEWS (Jan. 13, 2015), http://www.foxnews.com/story/2006/11/10/massachusetts-
judge-settles-dispute-by-ruling-burrito-is-not-sandwich.html [https://perma.cc/X6D4-23PE]. 
4  Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 196 (1964). 
5  Matthew U. Scherer, Regulating Artificial Intelligence Systems: Risks, Challenges, Com-
petencies, and Strategies, 29 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 353, 354 (2016). 
6  See discussion infra Part III; see generally Assemb. Con. Res. 215, 2017-18 Leg., Reg 
Sess. (Cal. 2018). 
7  See Scherer, supra note 5, at 359–62. 
8  CAL. EDUC. CODE § 75008 (West 2018); 410 ILL. COMP. STAT. 520/6 (2018); KY. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 367.680 (West 2018); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4763.01 (West 2018); OHIO 
REV. CODE ANN. § 4768.01 (West 2018); see discussion infra Part III. 
9  See discussion infra Sections III.B–III.C. 
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the applications of AI are expanding to a point where it will be impractical to 
define it for every application.10 
A general definition, therefore, can be used across fields and applications 
as long as the definition is flexible and encompasses the new development of 
autonomous AI. To do this, it is first necessary to untangle preconceived no-
tions of AI to determine what that term encompasses. Specifically, there needs 
to be a key distinction made between complex and sophisticated programs and 
systems, and systems that are capable of autonomy or human-like intelligence. 
Understanding this key distinction allows for an accurate definition of AI to be 
used across applications. 
The utility of such definitions must be understood in order to have an ap-
plicable and workable definition.11 For instance, the definitions of single-word 
nouns or short phrases can range from lengthy and complicated definitions to 
one- or two-word phrases.12 With AI, it is likely to be the former. It must be 
noted that even with a definition—no matter how precise or specific—that def-
inition will no doubt be the subject of litigation.13 Terms that are seemingly 
well-defined and settled, such as “physical force”14 or “serious drug offense,”15 
are brought to the Supreme Court for clarity on scope and application.16 I point 
this out not to dissuade anyone from the importance of statutory definitions, but 
to illuminate the fact that no definition is perfect. However, in this particular 
case the best definition would be one flexible enough to deal with new situa-
tions, as everyday there are new uses of AI.17 Nevertheless, creating a statutory 
definition can be beneficial to head off the unavoidable ambiguity courts will 
face when tasked with defining AI. 
The goal of this note is to first explain the invasiveness and impact that AI 
has and will have in our lives, and thus, why a legal definition is necessary for 
                                                        
10  See discussion infra Part I. 
11  Jeanne Frazier Price, Wagging, Not Barking: Statutory Definitions, 60 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 
999, 1000 (2013) (“Although practitioners and academics routinely interact with statutory 
definitions, there has been little discussion of the functions served by those definitions or of 
their utility.”). 
12  Id. 
13  Id. at 1001 (“But the frequency of litigation around the application of legislative defini-
tions belies that assumption. Within the last few years alone, the United States Supreme 
Court has on many occasions considered the scope and application of terms seemingly well 
defined by federal statute.”). 
14  Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S. 133, 135 (2010). 
15  McNeil v. United States, 563 U.S. 816, 817 (2011). 
16  See Price, supra note 11, at 1001 (“Within the last few years alone, the United States Su-
preme Court has on many occasions considered the scope and application of terms seeming-
ly well defined by federal statute.”). 
17  Id. at 1051 (“In a perfect world, we would expect definitions that are ‘crisp enough to ap-
ply and . . . flexible enough to deal with new situations.’ ”); Scherer, supra note 5, at 373 
(“Creating a working definition of AI will be difficult, to be sure, but coming up with precise 
legal definitions for imprecise terms is hardly a challenge unique to AI.”); see also infra Part 
I. 
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the legal field. Further, this note will explain what AI is, and its future devel-
opments. These explanations will help us outline computer science develop-
ments and the philosophical distinction between strong AI and weak AI. The 
distinction between strong AI and weak AI is useful in making distinct legal 
definitions concerning AI. In addition, this note will analyze a few current ex-
amples of definitions and discern their shortcomings. Finally, this paper will 
propose two possible methods for developing a definition for strong AI using 
the descriptive and prescriptive methods of legal definition drafting. 
I. WHY THIS MATTERS 
Artificial intelligence is pervasive in our lives, whether we realize it or 
not.18 One of the most public uses of AI is in driverless cars—which have been 
approved for road operation in five states as well as the District of Columbia—
and there are no signs of that growing industry slowing down.19 New develop-
ments, such as these cars, have prompted an AI arms race in the private sector, 
and AI could have as much as a $50 trillion economic value by 2025.20 This 
race toward better and more versatile AI has called for relegations and re-
strictions.21 Wanting to regulate new technology is nothing new, but what is 
surprising is the fact that so many tech industry leaders have voiced dire con-
cerns about AI.22 For example, Elon Musk stated that we are “summoning a 
demon” and that AI is probably our biggest existential threat.23 People can 
question whether Musk is being hyperbolic, but Stephen Hawking,24 Bill 
                                                        
18  See Scherer, supra note 5, at 354 (“It may not always be obvious, but we are living in the 
age of intelligent machines. Artificial intelligence (“AI”) permeates our lives in numerous 
subtle and not-so-subtle ways, performing tasks that, until quite recently, could only be per-
formed by a human with specialized knowledge, expensive training, or a government-issued 
license.”). 
19  Id.; Aaron M. Kessler, Law Left Behind as Hands-Free Cars Cruise, STARTRIBUNE (May 
3, 2015, 12:21 PM), http://www.startribune.com/law-left-behind-as-hands-free-cars-cruise/3 
02322781/ [https://perma.cc/3K7A-TVV7]. 
20  See Scherer, supra note 5, at 354; Charles Mizrahi, The Economic Impact of AI Projected 
to Be Over $14 Trillion, BANYAN HILL (Jan. 24, 2019), https://banyanhill.com/economic-im 
pact-ai-14-trillion/ [https://perma.cc/X6YS-BZYZ]. 
21  John Frank Weaver, We Need to Pass Legislation on Artificial Intelligence Early and Of-
ten, SLATE (Sept. 12, 2014, 3:53 PM), https://slate.com/technology/2014/09/we-need-to-pass 
-artificial-intelligence-laws-early-and-often.html [https://perma.cc/UUF3-Q86F]. 
22  Scherer, supra note 5, at 355 (“The potential for further rapid advances in AI technology 
has prompted expressions of alarm from many quarters, including some calls for government 
regulation of AI development and restrictions on AI operation.”). 
23  Aileen Graef, Elon Musk: We Are ‘Summoning a Demon’ with Artificial Intelligence, UPI 
(Oct. 27, 2014, 7:50 AM), https://www.upi.com/Business_News/2014/10/27/Elon-Musk-
We-are-summoning-a-demon-with-artificial-intelligence/4191414407652 [https://perma.cc/ 
U2ET-BAWX]. 
24  Rory Cellan-Jones, Stephen Hawking Warns Artificial Intelligence Could End Mankind, 
BBC (Dec. 2, 2014), http://www.bbc.com/news/technology-30290540 [https://perma.cc/D85 
7-B8LZ]. 
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Gates,25 and other scientists have expressed similar concerns.26 While some 
might dismiss these worries as exaggerations, there are nevertheless issues, le-
gal or otherwise, that arise out of the use and expansion of AI. 
There are also a number of legal questions that are being discussed today.27 
For instance, who is liable when a self-driving car causes an accident?28 Or to 
what degree can physicians let AI systems diagnose illnesses?29 Who is liable 
when an AI algorithm is trying to advertise to anti-Semitic groups?30 What 
happens if the AI system starts discriminating against women?31 Few states 
have laws to address these issues, and if they do, the laws are limited to drones 
or driverless cars.32 This lack of regulation may stem from the fact that tradi-
tional methods of regulation (tort liability, strict liability, or product licensing) 
are inadequate to cover AI.33 Because AI—in at least some part—is automatic, 
foreseeability and control are a major issue for liability and restrictions.34 While 
these are relatively new questions, it may be difficult to foresee future uses of 
AI, and thus future problems. 
AI had humble beginnings. But nowadays, it has innumerable applications 
that were unforeseeable when it was a nascent technology. One of the first ap-
plications of AI was its use as an opponent in a game of chess.35 Chess has 
                                                        
25  Peter Holley, Bill Gates on Dangers of Artificial Intelligence: ‘I Don’t Understand Why 




26  Risks from Artificial Intelligence, CTR. FOR STUDY EXISTENTIAL RISK, https://www.cser.ac 
.uk/research/risks-from-artificial-intelligence/ [https://perma.cc/CZW9-GCUR] (last visited 
Mar. 11, 2019). 
27  Brian Hall, Top 5 Legal Issues Inherent in AI and Machine Learning, TRAVERSE LEGAL 
(Nov. 15, 2017), https://www.traverselegal.com/blog/top-5-legal-issues-inherent-in-ai-and-
machine-learning/ [https://perma.cc/L2SD-XSM7]. 
28  See Scherer, supra note 5, at 356. 
29  Id. 
30  Aarti Shahani, Facebook Enabled Ads Targeting Anti-Semites, NPR (Sept. 15, 2017, 5:06 
AM), https://www.npr.org/2017/09/15/551163392/facebook-enabled-ads-targeting-anti-semi 
tes [https://perma.cc/8VNW-WV73]. 
31  Jeffrey Dastin, Amazon Scraps Secret AI Recruiting Tool that Showed Bias Against Wom-
en, REUTERS (Oct. 9, 2018, 8:12 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-amazon-com-jobs-
automation-insight/amazon-scraps-secret-ai-recruiting-tool-that-showed-bias-against-women 
-idUSKCN1MK08G [https://perma.cc/9H46-66TA]. 
32  See Ryan Calo, Robotics and the Lessons of Cyberlaw, 103 CALIF. L. REV. 513, 515–16 
(2015); Rachel Charney, Book Note, Can Androids Plead Automatism?, A Review of When 
Robots Kill: Artificial Intelligence Under the Criminal Law by Gabriel Hallevy, 73 U. 
TORONTO FAC. L. REV. 69, 72 (2015). 
33  See Scherer, supra note 5, at 356. 
34  Id. at 357. 
35  Mike Murphy, An AI Computer Learned How to Beat Almost Anyone at Chess in 72 
Hours, QUARTZ (Sept. 16, 2015), https://qz.com/502325/an-ai-computer-learned-how-to-beat 
-almost-anyone-at-chess-in-72-hours/ [https://perma.cc/US4C-PA6N]. 
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clearly defined rules and a finite number of moves, so a computer can run 
through all of the possibilities and pick the best one.36 But we have come a long 
way since Deep Blue beat Kasparov in chess over two decades ago.37 For ex-
ample, I.B.M.’s Watson destroyed Jeopardy champions,38 and more recently, 
Google’s DeepMind beat the world champion in Go, which is considered to be 
the most complex game.39 However, the capabilities of artificial systems are 
quickly going beyond games. 
AI is no longer limited to computational or statistical tasks and opera-
tions.40 AI is now being used to make investments on Wall Street, and it is ca-
pable of making 193,000 trades a day.41 Furthermore, the consumer behavior 
predictions used by online retail marketers are generated by an AI algorithm 
with great precision.42 AI is used in the medical field to predict heart attacks 
and heart disease or to detect Alzheimer’s, and more recently, AI is being used 
to spot colorectal cancer tumors before they become malignant with 86 percent 
accuracy.43 AI is also extremely good at computer tasks and can not only en-
hance pictures by increasing a photo’s resolution,44 but it can create realistic 
fake people to fill those photos.45 Even tasks that we assume require human 
                                                        
36  Garry Kasparov, Garry Kasparov: There’s No Shame in Losing to a Machine, FORTUNE 
(Sept. 25, 2017), http://fortune.com/2017/09/25/garry-kasparov-chess-strategy-artificial-intel 
ligence-ai/ [https://perma.cc/JV7W-EDT6]. 
37  Id. 
38  John Markoff, Computer Wins on ‘Jeopardy!’: Trivial, It’s Not, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 16, 
2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/17/science/17jeopardy-watson.html?pagewanted=a 
ll [https://perma.cc/AZ7R-2EC4]. 
39  Nature Video, The Computer That Mastered Go, YOUTUBE (Jan. 27, 2016), https://www. 
youtube.com/watch?v=g-dKXOlsf98 [https://perma.cc/2MZ4-ZXFY]; see also Vincent, su-
pra note 2 (describing additional AI abilities now being employed by big tech companies). 
40  See Vincent, supra note 2. 
41  Joe Ciolli, The Stock Market’s Robot Revolution is Here, BUS. INSIDER AUSTL. (Oct. 21, 
2017, 9:02 AM), http://www.businessinsider.com.au/ai-powered-equity-etf-stock-aieq-marke 
t-robot-revolution-2017-10 [https://perma.cc/9TLX-45C2]. 
42  Meet Genie, GREY JEAN TECHS., http://gjny.com/meet-genie/ [https://perma.cc/D5GR-FE 
PP] (last visited Mar. 12, 2019). 
43  Drew Harwell & Carolyn Y. Johnson, In Our Eyes, Google’s Software Sees Heart Attack 
Risk, WASH. POST (Feb. 19, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/20 
18/02/19/google-used-artificial-intelligence-to-predict-heart-attacks-with-the-human-eye/?no 
redirect=on&utm_term=.3dea14a86c12 [https://perma.cc/W9W3-RMCA]; Swapna Krishna, 
An AI Detected Colorectal Cancer with 86 Percent Accuracy, ENGADGET (Oct. 30, 2017), htt 
ps://www.engadget.com/2017/10/30/ai-colorectal-cancer-detection/ [https://perma.cc/W23S-
DHCP]; Press Release, Radiological Soc’y of N. Am., Artificial Intelligence May Aid in 
Alzheimer’s Diagnosis (July 6, 2016), https://press.rsna.org/timssnet/media/pressreleases/14 
_pr_target.cfm?ID=1890 [https://perma.cc/QKB2-F6FB]. 
44  Camille Charluet, This New AI Can Make Your Low Resolution Photos Great Again, THE 
NEXT WEB (Oct. 31, 2017), https://thenextweb.com/artificial-intelligence/2017/10/31/ai-can-
make-low-resolution-photos-great-again/ [https://perma.cc/RN9H-R7QX]. 
45  Roger Cheng, AI Can Create Fake Celebrity Photos so Real It’s Scary, CNET (Oct. 30, 
2017, 9:05 AM), https://www.cnet.com/news/ai-can-create-fake-celebrity-photos-so-real-its-
scary/?part=propeller&%3Bsubj=news&%3Btag=link [https://perma.cc/3SEW-BSDY]. 
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creativity are being tackled by AI—such as writing horror stories,46 creating 
music videos,47 or developing black metal albums.48 While these applications 
might seem presumably helpful and not harmful, the applications do stop there. 
There are also a fair share of science fiction applications already in the 
works, including: mind reading,49 predicting one’s death,50 creating computer 
voice generations that are indistinguishable from humans,51 and conducting 
surveillance for the Pentagon via drones and satellites.52 Last but not least, AI 
systems are being programed to be able to build other AI machines.53 The uses 
and functions of AI by no means end there, but it is becoming increasingly 
clear that AI systems will be able to do most tasks that humans can do, and do 
them better. It is also difficult to predict future uses for AI, especially since AI 
systems will most likely be the ones inventing new uses.54 
                                                        
46  Swapna Krishna, AI Can Write Surprisingly Scary and Creative Horror Stories, 
ENGADGET (Oct. 31, 2017), https://www.engadget.com/2017/10/31/shelley-ai-writes-horror-
stories-on-twitter/ [https://perma.cc/8YAT-3E53]. 
47  Jon Fingas, Intel AI Helped Create a Music Video, ENGADGET (Oct. 28, 2017), https://ww 
w.engadget.com/2017/10/28/intel-ai-helped-create-music-video/ [https://perma.cc/ER7N-87 
NT]. 
48  Mark Austin, A.I. Bots Just Dropped a Black Metal Album that Will Make Your Head Ex-
plode, DIGITAL TRENDS (Dec. 5, 2017, 10:04 AM), https://www.digitaltrends.com/music/dad 
abots-ai-death-metal-album/ [https://perma.cc/2CG6-ESGK]. 
49  Catherine Clifford, Japanese Scientists Just Used A.I. to Read Minds and It’s Amazing, 
CNBC (Jan. 8, 2018, 11:21 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/01/08/japanese-scientists-use-
artificial-intelligence-to-decode-thoughts.html [https://perma.cc/QKX2-H4AR]. 
50  Catherine Clifford, These Scientists Are Using A.I. to Predict When People Will Die for 
Better Access to Medical Care, CNBC (Jan. 25, 2018, 9:15 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/201 
8/01/24/ai-used-to-predict-when-people-may-die-for-better-medical-care.html [https://perma 
.cc/DUY4-VWMQ]. 
51  Dave Gershgorn, Google’s Voice-Generating AI is Now Indistinguishable from Humans, 
QUARTZ (Dec. 26, 2017), https://qz.com/1165775/googles-voice-generating-ai-is-now-indisti 
nguishable-from-humans/?utm_source [https://perma.cc/HGY2-GFHN]. 
52  Gregory C. Allen, The Pentagon is Using AI to Fight ISIS but It’s Not Quite the ‘Termi-
nator’, CNN (Dec. 30, 2017, 10:01 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2017/12/29/opinions/pentag 
on-is-using-artificial-intelligence-not-quite-the-terminator-opinion-allen/index.html [https://p 
erma.cc/8ELX-ZXD5]. 
53  Cade Metz, Building A.I. that Can Build A.I., N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 5, 2017), https://www.nyt 
imes.com/2017/11/05/technology/machine-learning-artificial-intelligence-ai.html [https://per 
ma.cc/AN48-BBQB]. 
54  Id. Just the period between the first draft of this paper in March 2018 and the second draft 
in July 2018, there have been impressive developments. AI can now perform a variety of 
human tasks. See, e.g., Aaron Brown, The Creepy AI that Can Predict the Future: Machine 
That Anticipates Your Movements Several Minutes in Advance Could Pave the Way for Next-
Level Big Brother Surveillance, DAILYMAIL.COM (June 15, 2018, 8:58 AM), http://www.dail 
ymail.co.uk/sciencetech/article-5847767/Creepy-AI-predict-moves-advance-lead-level-Big-
Brother-surveillance.html [https://perma.cc/FX8J-8ADE] (noting AI can predict human’s 
movements before they do them); Andrew Liszewski, MIT’s New AI-Powered Software Can 
Extract Individual Instruments from Videos with a Single Click, GIZMODO (July 5, 2018, 4:40 
PM), https://gizmodo.com/mits-new-ai-powered-software-can-extract-individual-ins-182737 
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Given the plethora of applications of AI, it seems like we should have a 
clear definition of what qualities make all of these “AI.” What was once con-
sidered AI no longer qualifies as artificially intelligent technology and applica-
tions advance. However, despite this evolution, scientists, programmers, phi-
losophers, and lawyers do not have a clear understanding of what AI is. 
Attempting to define AI is nothing new, but what is different now is the neces-
sity of a definition, and specifically a legal definition. In order to be able to de-
fine it, however, the legal field needs to understand what AI is, as well as what 
makes it unique from other technological advances, including what is currently 
being called “AI.” 
                                                                                                                                
2032 [https://perma.cc/J35Q-69DE] (noting AI can extract a single instrument from a song); 
Sam Machkovech, This Wild AI-Generated Film Is the Next Step in “Whole Movie Puppet-
ry,” ARS TECHNICA (June 11, 2018, 9:01 AM), https://arstechnica.com/gaming/2018/06/this-
wild-ai-generated-film-is-the-next-step-in-whole-movie-puppetry/ [https://perma.cc/34LP-J5 
VT] (noting AI can create films); Andy Meek, It’s a Little Scary How Smart Google’s 
DeepMind Just Got, BGR (June 15, 2018, 2:58 PM), https://bgr.com/2018/06/15/google-dee 
pmind-render-3d-objects-from-2d-images/ [https://perma.cc/DR78-D4ZT] (noting AI can 
crush players in video games); Stephanie Mlot, Artificial Intelligence Can Sense Humans 
Through Walls, GEEK.COM (June 14, 2018), https://www.geek.com/tech/artificial-intelligenc 
e-can-sense-humans-through-walls-1743205/ [https://perma.cc/SEE2-4PRF] (noting AI can 
sense humans through walls); Jack Morse, Watch Out Google Duplex: Microsoft Just De-
moed Its Own AI Having a Full-On Phone Call, MASHABLE (May 22, 2018), https://mashabl 
e.com/2018/05/22/microsoft-ai-demo-xiaoice/#SS_dCtrMVgqS [https://perma.cc/V3S4-D92 
H] (noting AI systems can now make full on phone calls); Angela Moscaritolo, IBM Artifi-
cial Intelligence Takes on Human Debate Champs, PCMAG.COM (June 19, 2018, 12:25 PM), 
https://www.pcmag.com/news/361938/ibm-artificial-intelligence-takes-on-human-debate-
champs [https://perma.cc/MPE3-KBYJ] (noting AI can debate people); Brian Resnick, How 
Data Scientists Are Using AI for Suicide Prevention, VOX (June 9, 2018, 7:22 AM), https://w 
ww.vox.com/science-and-health/2018/6/8/17441452/suicide-prevention-anthony-bourdain-cr 
isis-text-line-data-science [https://perma.cc/85BX-SMNY] (noting AI can help prevent sui-
cide); Phil Stewart, Deep in the Pentagon, a Secret AI Program to Find Nuclear Missiles, 
REUTERS (June 5, 2018, 3:07 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-pentagon-missiles 
-ai-insight/deep-in-the-pentagon-a-secret-ai-program-to-find-hidden-nuclear-missiles-idUSK 
CN1J114J [https://perma.cc/3HCM-KQEW] (noting AI can find hidden nuclear missiles); 
James Vincent, This Japanese AI Security Camera Shows the Future of Surveillance Will Be 
Automated, VERGE (June 26, 2018, 7:31 AM), https://www.theverge.com/2018/6/26/174790 
68/ai-guardman-security-camera-shoplifter-japan-automated-surveillance [https://perma.cc/8 
TGY-88C9] (noting AI can provide video surveillance); Kyle Wiggers, Google’s DeepMind 
Developed an IQ Test for AI Models, VENTUREBEAT (July 11, 2018, 10:52 AM), https://vent 
urebeat.com/2018/07/11/googles-deepmind-developed-an-iq-test-for-ai-models/ [https://per 
ma.cc/A9FJ-D2DW] (noting AI can even develop a test to measure other AIs); Kyle Wig-
gers, Google’s DeepMind Develops AI That Can Render 3D Objects from 2D Pictures, 
VENTUREBEAT (June 14, 2018, 12:13 PM), https://venturebeat.com/2018/06/14/googles-
deepmind-develops-ai-that-can-render-3d-objects-from-2d-pictures/ [https://perma.cc/6BXQ 
-4V4N] (noting AI can render 3D objects from 2D pictures). There will be countless other 
applications by the time this paper even goes to print. 
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II. WHAT IS ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE? 
“What is Artificial Intelligence?” is not only a difficult question in and of 
itself, but it is particularly difficult because it is not clear who can or should an-
swer the question.55 Philosophers, computer scientists, and cognitive scientists 
are just a few of the groups who have attempted to answer this very question.56 
Although they disagree about what constitutes AI, they tend to acknowledge 
the relevance and significance of the question.57 While this question may not be 
any easier to answer, it does raise the consideration of whether the legal field 
even cares what intelligence is in this context. Although, the court does care 
about intelligence when pertaining to people.58 A legal definition may not turn 
on whether something qualifies as intelligent, but it is certainly a starting point. 
A. The Development of Artificial Intelligence 
Before there can be suitable regulation, legislation, or implementation, 
there must be a definition-based conceptual understanding.59 The hang-up in 
defining AI is, in large part, because of the ambiguity of “intelligence.”60 We 
recognize intelligence in ourselves, so we link our understanding of intelligence 
to human characteristics.61 One understanding of intelligence is tied to the abil-
ity to perform intellectual tasks.62 However, as technology advances, so too do 
the tasks computers can accomplish.63 As machines accomplish more tasks, we 
tend not to consider them as reaching intelligence, but instead we move the 
threshold of intelligence farther away and then treat that specific task as unin-
dicative of intelligence.64 The history of artificial machine development has 
certainly made this point clear. 
Intelligent machines have been a serious focus of research since the mid-
1950s, when computer scientists began developing programs that could solve 
                                                        
55  See Scherer, supra note 5, at 373, 396. 
56  See generally STUART J. RUSSELL & PETER NORVIG, ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE: A 
MODERN APPROACH xii (3d ed. 2016); John R. Searle, Minds, Brains, and Programs, BEHAV. 
& BRAIN SCIS. 417, 417 (1980); John E. Laird et al., A Standard Model of the Mind: Toward 
a Common Computational Framework Across Artificial Intelligence, Cognitive Science, 
Neuroscience, and Robotics, AI MAGAZINE, Winter 2017, at 13, 14. 
57  See generally sources cited supra note 56. 
58  Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 756 (1970); Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242 
(1969) (holding that for guilty pleas to count the court must find that the defendant made it 
intelligently). This is one of the many examples where intelligence is a critical condition. 
59  See generally Scherer, supra note 5, at 359; John McCarthy, What is Artificial Intelli-
gence? STAN. FORMAL REASONING GRP. (Nov. 12, 2007), http://www-formal.stanford.edu/jm 
c/whatisai/node1.html [https://perma.cc/PR7N-YGD4]. 
60  See Scherer, supra note 5, at 359 (“The difficulty in defining artificial intelligence lies not 
in the concept of artificiality but rather in the conceptual ambiguity of intelligence.”). 
61  Id. at 359–60; see generally McCarthy, supra note 59. 
62  Scherer, supra note 5, at 360. 
63  Id. at 360–61. 
64  Id. at 361. 
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problems previously thought to require intelligence.65 From there, computer 
scientists developed systems with the ability to play chess, action-plan, sched-
ule tasks, and other complex tasks.66 However, it became clear that these sys-
tems were developed to mimic the behavior of human intelligence, not neces-
sarily to exercise human intelligence.67 And this clarity highlights the 
distinction between sophisticated programs and machines actually capable of 
thinking and decision making.68 Despite this distinction, researchers continued 
to develop more sophisticated machines capable of data-mining or creating 
train and airline schedules.69 As machines became more capable, the question 
still remained whether this was human intelligence.70 
The Turing test has been a common method used to ascertain if human in-
telligence has been reached.71 In the test, a person has a conversation with an 
unknown thing on the other end, either an AI system or an actual person.72 If 
the person is conversing with a machine but thinks he or she is communicating 
with a person, then the machine is said to exhibit at least some intelligence.73 
This test is by no means conclusive, but it is still a common test to run. Alt-
hough recently, it is worth mentioning that Google’s AI has more or less con-
quered the Turing test.74 Still, if the question is whether or not something has 
intelligence, there needs to be some form of measurement.75 
The Turing test has withstood the advancement of technology because it 
forces the computer to imitate human behavior, giving it a strong anthropocen-
tric bias.76 For instance, what we consider simple questions—like “what is your 
oldest memory?” or “what was your most painful moment?”—quickly expose 
that one is speaking to a machine.77 There are other assessments and thought 
experiments that highlight the complication of discerning a machine from a 
                                                        
65  ARLINDO OLIVEIRA, THE DIGITAL MIND: HOW SCIENCE IS REDEFINING HUMANITY 87–88 
(2017). 
66  Id. at 88. 
67  Id. 
68  See discussion infra Section II.D; see generally Searle, supra note 56, at 417. 
69  See OLIVEIRA, supra note 65, at 89. 
70  Id. 
71  Id. at 90; see also RUSSELL & NORVIG, supra note 56, at 2. 
72  OLIVEIRA, supra note 65, at 90. 
73  Id. 
74  David Gewirtz, Google Duplex Beat the Turing Test: Are We Doomed?, ZDNET (May 14, 
2018, 6:29 PM), https://www.zdnet.com/article/google-duplex-beat-the-turing-test-are-we-
doomed/ [https://perma.cc/6EL8-HYQS]; Andrew Tarantola, Pretty Sure Google’s New 
Talking AI Just Beat the Turing Test, ENGADGET (May 8, 2018), https://www.engadget.com/ 
2018/05/08/pretty-sure-googles-new-talking-ai-just-beat-the-turing-test/ [https://perma.cc/Z3 
EC-53DW]. 
75  See generally HANDBOOK OF INTELLIGENCE 3 (Robert J. Sternberg ed., 2000). 
76  See OLIVEIRA, supra note 65, at 90–91. 
77  Id. at 91. 
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human.78 Nevertheless, the central focus of AI research has been in determining 
and mimicking human intelligence.79 There are countless advancements and 
techniques that aim to reach the level of human intelligence,80 such as through 
the use of pattern recognition, complex communication, and machine learn-
ing.81 However, all of this research and development has led to varying defini-
tions of what qualifies as AI, each of which focus on different attributes that are 
deemed to be “intelligence.” 
B. Computer Science Approaches to Artificial Intelligence 
Stuart Russell and Peter Norvig outline various definitions of “artificial in-
telligence” that fall into four categories: acting humanely, thinking humanely, 
thinking rationally, and acting rationally.82 The goal of these definitions is to 
point to the attribute that necessarily signifies intelligence.83 First, the Turing 
test is meant to demonstrate that if an AI system is acting human, then it is in-
telligent. This is an operational definition of “intelligence.”84 While acting hu-
manly may be a sign of intelligence, it is certainly not the only condition.85 The 
cognitive modeling approach focuses on whether the machine thinks humanly. 
Under this approach, intelligence is a product of how humans think, and thus, 
an artificial intelligence system must match the human-mode of thinking in or-
der to be considered intelligent.86 Comparatively, thinking rationally involves 
following the logician tradition of formalizing informal knowledge into logical 
notation, which is rule following.87 Finally, the rational agent approach focuses 
on acting rationally. Under that approach, an agent is one who perceives and 
acts, and to act rationally is to act “so as to achieve one’s goals, given one’s be-
liefs.”88 
These approaches are by no means exclusive of one another, and each ap-
proach has its faults and counter arguments as to why the other is not intelli-
                                                        
78  See generally RUSSELL & NORVIG, supra note 56, at 1–4; JOHN SEARLE, MINDS, BRAINS 
AND SCIENCE 28–41 (1984); Searle, supra note 56, at 417. 
79  See generally OLIVEIRA, supra note 65, at 87–97. 
80  Id. at 94–95. 
81  See ERIK BRYNJOLFSSON & ANDREW MCAFEE, THE SECOND MACHINE AGE 17–18, 20, 22 
(2014). 
82  See RUSSELL & NORVIG, supra note 56, at 2–4. 
83  See id. 
84  Id. at 2. 
85  See id. at 3. 
86  Id. However, there is still the issue of figuring out how one thinks. Castelfranchi, supra 
note 2, at 298 (noting that in an interview Turing said, “The whole thinking process is still 
rather mysterious to us, but I believe the attempt to make a thinking machine will help us 
greatly in finding out how we think ourselves.”). 
87  See RUSSELL & NORVIG, supra note 56, at 4. 
88  See STUART J. RUSSELL & PETER NORVIG, ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE: A MODERN 
APPROACH 7 (1st ed. 1995). 
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gence.89 Acting humanly can be accomplished by mimicking human respons-
es.90 Figuring out how we think is difficult, but it seems as if three separate 
methods of thinking could still reach the level of intelligence.91 Humans often-
times do not think rationally.92 And acting rationally is circular because to act 
toward goals, one must have beliefs, and to have beliefs one must be intelligent. 
However, modern AI is based on the rational agent’s theory outlined by John 
von Neumann.93 Although there is no settled characteristic or mode of intelli-
gence, these definitions highlight what we consider attributes of intelligence, 
and it is these attributes that legal definition should incorporate.94 Each of these 
definitions, whether explicitly stated or not, point to a critical attribute of intel-
ligence: autonomy. Each of these approaches acknowledges autonomy, regard-
less of which is indicative of intelligence. 
C. Autonomy 
The most distinct characteristic of intelligence is autonomy.95 Autonomy is 
considered to be a condition of thinking.96 This autonomy allows for the attrib-
ution of thinking or intelligence to children and animals, but not machines, as 
machines just do as they are told.97 However, as machines are becoming more 
advanced, AI systems are beginning to exhibit and exercise autonomy—making 
decisions free from outside input.98 This is by design, as machine learning sys-
tems need to be free from human input, otherwise AI systems simply could not 
learn or function as intended.99 To be clear, there was human input in the form 
of the initial programming, but the purpose of the system is to learn and to pro-
vide unprogrammed outputs. 
There are multiple benefits to AI machines having autonomy. Humans tend 
to think in a certain way, a way in which machines may not be bound by. Thus, 
AI systems are able to come up with unconventional solutions that humans 
                                                        
89  See RUSSELL & NORVIG, supra note 56, at 1–2. 
90  See id. at 2. 
91  Id. at 3 (describing introspection, psychological experiments, and brain imaging as three 
separate methods of thinking). 
92  See id. at 2 n.1. 
93  Steve Omohundro, A Turning Point in Artificial Intelligence, in WHAT TO THINK ABOUT 
MACHINES THAT THINK 12 (John Brockman ed., 2015). 
94  See Scherer, supra note 5, at 360. The legal field need not, and probably should not, be 
the one that determines what approach is the most indicative of intelligence. What matters is 
that when creating a statutory definition, for any word or phrase, that the definition is as ac-
curate and functional as it needs it be. 
95  Id. at 363. 
96  See Castelfranchi, supra note 2, at 298. 
97  Id. 
98  Torben Friehe, How Much Autonomy Is Too Much for AI?, NEXT WEB (Nov. 18, 2017), 
https://thenextweb.com/contributors/2017/11/18/much-autonomy-much-ai/ [https://perma.cc/ 
TEW3-JSBK]. 
99  Id.; Murphy, supra note 35; Vincent, supra note 2. 
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cannot come up with.100 Currently, AI machines acting unpredictably means 
that they design something in a unique way or that they perform an unexpected 
move in chess or Go.101 In the future, however, AI systems’ unpredictability 
will be able to come up with solutions not only to problems we cannot solve, 
but also to problems we are not even aware of, and this will happen more fre-
quently.102 This is one of the major appeals of these types of systems: the abil-
ity to learn and surpass our problem-solving abilities.103 Therefore, we need AI 
systems to have some autonomy, which makes the distinction between autono-
mous decision making systems and non-autonomous systems even more criti-
cal. 
Yet, with AI systems acting autonomously, there is going to be a question 
about control.104 Building autonomous AI is the goal, which means that devel-
opers could lose control of the systems they create.105 Of course developers are 
the ones who program the objectives of the system; however, objectives could 
be vague or ambiguous and the AI system could use undesirable means to carry 
out that objective.106 Moreover, AI systems might not want to give up con-
trol.107 These are a few potential considerations that highlight the distinction 
between systems capable of making their own decisions and other systems that 
function in prescribed parameters. Because of the potential problems, it is im-
portant to distinguish between autonomous and non-autonomous AI. 
D. Strong AI & Weak AI 
There is a helpful distinction from the field of philosophy of mind that 
sheds light on this difficult concept: strong AI and weak AI. Although, it 
should be mentioned that like most, if not all, philosophical theories, there are 
people who disagree. However, this distinction is useful for semantic and 
pragmatic purposes. Weak AI is the concept that whatever the program is 
meant to do, it is merely trying to replicate or duplicate that function, and for 
most tasks that is sufficient.108 Whereas strong AI is an actual instantiation of 
that thing, which in this case is intelligence.109 Simply put, weak AI simulates, 
whereas strong AI just is. 
                                                        
100  See Scherer, supra note 5, at 365. 
101  Id.; Nature Video, supra note 39. 
102  See Scherer, supra note 5, at 365 (“The AI’s solution thus may not have been foreseeable 
to a human—even the human that designed the AI . . . . AI behavior will crop up with in-
creasing frequency and that the unexpectedness of AI behavior will rise significantly.”). 
103  Id. 
104  Id. at 366; see also Friehe, supra note 98. 
105  See Scherer, supra note 5, at 367. 
106  Id. 
107  Id. at 368. 
108  Searle, supra note 56, at 417. 
109  Id. 
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Weak AI is nothing new, it is the simulation of decision making. For ex-
ample, the system that beat Kasparov at chess was calculating the best possible 
outcomes and making moves according to an algorithm.110 Here, we can say 
that the system was imitating intelligence by “thinking” about which move to 
make and then making it.111 The system is actually playing chess, but it is not 
actually thinking or deliberating about which move to make like people 
might.112 This is far different than strong AI, which is closer to decision making 
based on intelligence. Google’s Deepmind system utilizes machine learning to 
learn from experience and makes autonomous decisions much like what we 
consider intelligence.113 Thus, it is strong AI, or at least close.114 
There are a lot of questions about how fine the line is between strong AI 
and weak AI, as well as questions about what qualifies as either form and how 
we would know. But this distinction still highlights an important and useful dif-
ference. Colloquially, our typical use of the phrase “artificial intelligence” does 
not differentiate between strong AI and weak AI, and the two are conflated and 
treated equally,115 which could mean equal legal treatment. This distinction 
matters because there is a difference in autonomy, which could result in une-
qual legal treatment. An analogous legal example would be the difference be-
tween treatment of a minor and of an adult. Parents can be liable for the actions 
of their minor children, whereas parents are not liable for the actions of their 
adult children.116 Or, in the case of criminal justice, minors are usually given 
lesser sentences than adults.117 Similarly, weak AI systems (i.e., systems where 
the developer has control) would make the developer liable just as a parent 
would be liable for the actions of a minor. Whereas strong AI may be treated as 
an adult, weak AI would be treated as a minor. To be clear, strict liability may 
be the best solution for both strong AI and weak AI, but the distinction is still 
helpful. We would still need the distinction between adults and minors even if 
parents were strictly liable for their children. Therefore, my argument is that we 
need a legal definition that both separates the weak AI and strong AI, regard-
less of whether the legal system treats them similarly or differently. 
                                                        
110  Kasparov, supra note 36. 
111  See Murphy, supra note 35. 
112  This would be the “thinking humanly.” See RUSSELL & NORVIG, supra note 56, at 3. 
113  James Vincent, DeepMind’s Go-Playing AI Doesn’t Need Human Help to Beat Us Any-
more, VERGE (Oct. 18, 2017, 1:00 PM), https://www.theverge.com/2017/10/18/16495548/de 
epmind-ai-go-alphago-zero-self-taught [https://perma.cc/RD2Y-Q3RF]. 
114  It may be difficult to tell when the hard AI threshold met, yet that does not undermine 
that the distinction is still there. If there is a legal difference, say in liability, between strong 
AI and weak AI, this threshold question will become significant as attorneys will argue for 
the one that best suits them. 
115  See Vincent, supra note 2; see also discussion supra Part I. 
116  See Larry Cunningham, A Question of Capacity: Towards a Comprehensive and Con-
sistent Vision of Children and Their Status under Law, 10 U.C. DAVIS J. JUV. L. & POL’Y 
275, 321, 333 (2006); Arthur T. Spence, Parental Liability, 309 INS. L.J. 787, 788 (1948). 
117  Cunningham, supra note 116, at 277, 279. 
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This section covered several fundamental conceptions and attributes of AI, 
which in our current usage may or may not be part of what people mean when 
they say “artificial intelligence.” The strong AI/weak AI distinction is useful in 
teasing out one conception of AI from another: complex algorithmic systems 
and systems that exhibit autonomous intelligence and decision making. Defin-
ing strong AI will necessarily define weak AI because setting parameters for 
the former will exclude the latter. Many jurisdictions already incorporate weak 
AI in their statutes because it often falls under computer codes, programs, soft-
ware, or algorithms, and thus, is already covered by some definition or provi-
sion if necessary.118 However, because of the fundamental difference between 
strong AI and weak AI, a distinct legal definition is needed for strong AI. Thus, 
the distinction and attributes mentioned above should be considered when for-
mulating a legal definition. 
III. CURRENT STATE OF AI DEFINITIONS 
Some jurisdictions that have been proactive and have defined AI in one 
form other another.119 However, these definitions either lack a fundamental un-
derstanding or are entirely too broad as to provide any help at all. Furthermore, 
if a jurisdiction even has a definition it will likely limit the definition to specific 
contexts.120 There are many different places where a lawyer or judge can look 
to for guidance when attempting to discern if a system qualifies as AI. A dic-
tionary is a common source,121 as well as statutes from other jurisdictions;122 
so, it can be useful to look at other sources to determine how other jurisdictions 
are currently defining artificial intelligence. 
A. Black’s Law Dictionary 
Black’s Law Dictionary is a commonly referred to source of terms and def-
initions. The definition of artificial intelligence in Black’s Law Dictionary is 
“software used to make computers and robots work better than humans. The 
systems are rule based or neutral networks. It is used to help make new prod-
ucts, robotics, human language understanding, and computer vision.”123 Signif-
icant problems exist with this definition, which run contrary to understanding 
what AI is considered today, especially when juxtaposed with machine learn-
                                                        
118  See sources cited supra note 8. 
119  See supra Part III. 
120  See supra Part III; see also NEV. REV. STAT. § 482A.020 (repealed 2013) (limiting the 
definition to autonomous vehicles). 
121  See Artificial Intelligence, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dicti 
onary/artificial%20intelligence?utm_campaign=sd&utm_medium=serp&utm_source=jsonld 
[https://perma.cc/ZM9X-EAKG] (last visited Mar. 15, 2019) (defining artificial intelligence 
as “the capability of a machine to imitate intelligent human behavior”). 
122  See infra Sections III.B–III.C. 
123  Artificial Intelligence, THE LAW DICTIONARY, https://thelawdictionary.org/artificial-intell 
igence/ [https://perma.cc/5BPN-YBTE] (last visited Mar. 15, 2019). 
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ing.124 However, this definition limits AI to only two forms: rule based or neu-
ral networks.125 So, for something to qualify as AI under the first two prongs, 
it: (1) must be software, which does not seem controversial, although what 
qualifies as software might carry with it a loaded meaning or ambiguity;126 and 
(2) the systems must be rule based or neural networks.127 While this is a good 
start that provides some guidance, the latter part of the definition is unhelpful. 
Black’s characterizes AI as a tool, which in and of itself is not wrong. The 
primary focus of development is to better our lives or to become more efficient 
in some way. However, when contrasted to what we currently call “tools,” such 
as hammers, books, or Westlaw, these tools seem incomparable to a software 
that acts on its own. It would be wrong to say that there are not autonomous 
tools in some form (e.g., automated factories), but there is a difference between 
following pre-registered actions to construct a car and learning to make better 
autonomous decisions on what stock to invest in.128 Put another way, it does 
not seem like a tool if it is doing the entire job on its own. In addition, the latter 
part of the definition is just too broad. It includes digital watches because those 
are better than people at tracking time and are rule-based software. But digital 
watches are far from AI. It is the last part of the definition which confuses and 
misleads. 
The phrase “used to help make new products, robotics, human language 
understanding, and computer vision,” is also problematic as it makes it seem as 
if the point of AI is limited to these things. This definition binds the qualifica-
tion to just these few uses. This is problematic because AI’s uses are by no 
means limited, and thus, the definition focuses on narrow uses. Primarily, this 
definition ignores the autonomy. These are just a few of the many problems 
that arise out of this definition. While Black’s Law Dictionary is neither a stat-
ute nor binding precedent, it is a common tool used by the legal community and 
could be a place that lawyers, judges, or policy makers may look to for guid-
ance; however, in this case, that guidance is unsatisfactory. 
B. Nevada 
Nevada does not have a standalone definition for AI, but they did attempt 
to define it in terms of a specific application: autonomous vehicles.129 While 
this statute was ultimately repealed, it demonstrates both an approach to defin-
ing AI, and a significant modern development in AI that states will have to con-
                                                        
124  See discussion supra Part I. 
125  See Artificial Intelligence, supra note 123. 
126  Software, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). We tend to think of software as 
non-autonomous and self-driving cars are more than just software. 
127  See Artificial Intelligence, supra note 123. 
128  AI News: Artificial Intelligence Trends and Leading Stocks, INV. BUS. DAILY, https://ww 
w.investors.com/news/technology/ai-news-artificial-intelligence-trends-and-leading-stocks/ [ 
https://perma.cc/8WQL-AZRL] (last updated Feb. 25, 2019). 
129  NEV. REV. STAT. § 482A.020 (repealed 2013). 
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front. The Nevada statute states, “ ‘Artificial intelligence’ means the use of 
computers and related equipment to enable a machine to duplicate or mimic the 
behavior of human beings.”130 While this definition seems overly broad, the 
definition only applies to self-driving vehicles, which narrows its scope. This 
narrowing is not necessarily bad, but it does require the existence of definitions 
for each application, which could be problematic with the increasing uses of 
AI. 
While this definition conflates strong AI and weak AI (i.e., it treats auton-
omous AI the same as rule-based systems), it does so for good reason. Because 
driving is such a complicated task that requires numerous capabilities happen-
ing simultaneously, there are countless systems working together to create one 
AI machine capable of driving.131 These machines are performing the innumer-
able functions and making the necessary perceptions and decisions required for 
driving: perceiving everything in sight such as cars, bikers, signs, etc.; utilizing 
the motor skills involved, such as accelerating, steering, braking, or shifting 
gears; and engaging in the cognitive functions that go into navigating, knowing 
when to stop, or changing lanes. Driving is far more complex than analyzing 
data, making probable predictions, and making decisions based on those predic-
tions. Every task involved in driving a car needs to be broken down into small-
er, more manageable systems. 
The process is broken into subparts for each AI system to control and then 
put them together to create a self-driving car.132 This is an explanation as to 
why Nevada’s definition is very broad. “The use of computers and related 
equipment” does not outline a very clear list or necessary conditions to quali-
fy.133 AI, under this definition, would include even the small things, such as a 
text-to-speech systems for GPS. The overbreadth is not a bad thing in this con-
text because of how goal- and function-oriented the definition is. The goal is to 
have driver-less cars that can function as if a person was doing the operation, 
and the systems or software needed to accomplish such a task is necessarily in-
cluded in the definition. This definition can be broad because it is already con-
fined by the scope of what statute it is defined under. 
Therefore, while this definition may work for this specific purpose, it does 
not provide a lot of guidance on how to define AI generally. Because of the 
complexity of autonomous vehicles, the AI involved is on multiple levels and 
that create an AI system overall. Here, the autonomy is built into the function. 
So, while it may be difficult to pinpoint which system inside this conglomerate 
                                                        
130  Id. 
131  Ashish, Autonomous Cars and Artificial Intelligence (AI), CODEMENTOR (July 30, 2017), 
https://www.codementor.io/ashish1dev/autonomous-cars-and-artificial-intelligence-ai-adzk2 
yk4x [https://perma.cc/XP3R-F69G]; Chris Giarratana, How AI is Driving the Future of Au-
tonomous Cars, READWRITE (Dec. 20, 2016), https://readwrite.com/2016/12/20/ai-driving-fu 
ture-autonomous-cars-tl4/ [https://perma.cc/B5SE-X9PL]. 
132  See Giarratana, supra note 131. 
133  NEV. REV. STAT. § 482A.020 (repealed 2013). 
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system is truly autonomous, from one end being the air-conditioning system to 
the other end being the system navigation, we would call the whole thing “au-
tonomous.” Thus, the generality in which “AI” is defined is excusable because 
the goal is to create a composite system within the context and scope of the 
statute. 
C. Louisiana 
A Louisiana statute focuses on defining “electronic agents” in regards to 
autonomation, but notably, an annotation for this statute contemplates the fu-
ture developments of AI and how there could be a relevant distinction between 
weak AI and strong AI.134 Under Louisiana’s property, contracts, and financial 
services code, Louisiana law accounts for electronic commerce and the elec-
tronic agents that could be used to carry out such transactions.135 The Louisiana 
Uniform Electronic Transaction Act includes an annotation demarcating be-
tween different types of electronic agents: 
5. “Electronic agent.” 
(a) This definition establishes that an electronic agent is a machine. As the term 
is used in this Chapter, it is limited to the function of a tool. The effect on the 
party using the agent is addressed in the operative provisions of this Chapter 
(e.g., Section 2614). 
(b) An electronic agent, such as a computer program or other automated means 
employed by a person, is a tool of that person. As a general rule, the employer of 
a tool is responsible for the results obtained by the use of that tool since the tool 
has no independent volition of its own. However, an electronic agent, by defini-
tion, is capable within the parameters of its programming, of initiating, respond-
ing or interacting with other parties or their electronic agents once it has been 
activated by a party, without further attention of that party. 
(c) While this Chapter presupposes that an electronic agent is capable of per-
forming only within the technical strictures of its preset programming, it is con-
ceivable that in the future, electronic agents may be created with the ability to 
act autonomously, and not just automatically. That is, through developments in 
artificial intelligence, a computer may be able to “learn through experience, 
modify the instructions in their own programs, and even devise new instruc-
tions.” If these developments occur, the courts may construe the definition of 
electronic agent accordingly, to recognize such new capabilities.136 
This statute’s annotation articulates the differences between weak and 
strong AI. The former is explained in sections (a) and (b) as nothing more than 
a tool, and such, that tool is confined to its functions outlined by its program-
ming parameters.137 The annotation goes as far as to assign liability to the user 
of the computer, even if the computer communicates with other parties or 
                                                        
134  LA. STAT. ANN. § 9:2602 (2018). 
135  Id. 
136  Id. 
137  Id. 
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agents autonomously.138 Here, the statute recognizes the difference between au-
tomation and autonomy even though in this circumstance they go hand in hand, 
yet the user is still liable because the program is acting within its own parame-
ters. However, the annotations go one step further and acknowledge strong AI 
as a possibility. 
Section (c) recognizes that AI can learn and develop as it has experiences, 
exhibiting functions of machine learning.139 Furthermore, the annotation cate-
gorizes AI as something that can devise new instructions and change its own 
programing, further highlighting the similarities between human and AI.140 The 
Louisiana statute also explicitly states that it may need to modify this statute as 
technology advances, demonstrating how this technology might evolve.141 This 
statute denotes legislative intent for how to qualify computer agents as either 
strong AI or weak AI machines. This definition is at least on the right track, 
although it might still run into the same problem present within the Nevada 
statute as only being applicable to a specific context. 
Although these examples are not all of the definitions out there, they pro-
vide a good lay of the land. Definitions can either be overly broad and include a 
wide array of systems, or they can be field specific and define AI for a specific 
application. The difference in approach can lead to different problems. Creating 
a definition for each application is burdensome and will nevertheless skirt the 
issue of defining AI. With the ever-expanding applications of AI, each field or 
subset of laws will need to include a definition for AI for that particular use. 
However, if jurisdictions wish to define AI specifically for each application, 
then every new application still begs the question, “does this specific instance 
qualify as ‘AI’?” While this is not necessarily problematic, it is certainly cum-
bersome and frustrating. A general definition for AI can be applied across the 
board to all fields if written properly. 
IV. METHODS FOR WRITING A GENERAL DEFINITION 
Creating a functioning legal definition is difficult enough, but there is the 
added issue of who should determine definitions and regulations—the courts, 
legislature, or other government agencies?142 As Justice Alito mentioned, the 
legislature might have done the research and formulated a particular law or def-
inition, so they might be in a good position for their given circumstances.143 As 
mentioned above, Nevada’s legislature only sought fit, at least at the moment, 
to define AI in terms of its function in self-driving cars.144 Statutes can be 
                                                        
138  Id. 
139  Id.; see also Vincent, supra note 2. 
140  See discussion supra Parts I–II. 
141  LA. STAT. ANN. § 9:2602 (2018). 
142  See Scherer, supra note 5, at 356. 
143  See Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 806 (2011) (Alito, J., concurring). 
144  See supra Section III.B. 
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preemptory or reactionary, but nonetheless, policy makers need to understand 
AI, specifically strong AI. Without comprehension there cannot be a sufficient 
legal definition.145 Furthermore, this requires understanding how “AI” func-
tions as a phrase to be able to define it pragmatically. 
Despite the common use of words or phrases, “shared words need not have 
shared meanings,” and “legal systems can ascribe whatever meaning(s) they 
desire to the words that they borrow, inherit, or invent.”146 Although the words 
“artificial intelligence” are shared words, they do not have a shared meaning. 
Part of the legislature’s and judiciary’s role is to define the “meanings of words 
to reflect the unique priorities, preferences, and goals of a judicial, political, or 
social system.”147 These goals might include legal regulation or economic con-
siderations that will certainly arise.148 For certain words, it is possible to discern 
a common meaning from its variant meanings;149 however, because “AI’s” 
meaning is all over the place, a common meaning is difficult to discern, and 
perhaps unnecessary.150 “Traffic,” for instance, is an ordinary term that has a 
couple definitions, but 18 U.S.C § 2320 defines it purposely for the section.151 
This is standard—codes and acts are going to have these definitions out of ne-
cessity.152 Thus, stipulating a definition can rid “AI” of the ambiguity in which 
the phrase is used. 
Ridding terms of ambiguity is essential because terms have functions and 
effects.153 The major function is to tell people what a term or phrase means in 
particular contexts, or put simply, to clarify.154 However, the second function is 
to empower, or to give a particular status to something or someone.155 These 
                                                        
145  See supra Parts I–II. 
146  Thomas O. Main, The Word Commons and Foreign Laws, 46 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 219, 
222, 225 (2013) (“Because words have more than one meaning, we can discern from those 
variant meanings what we might call a common meaning.”). 
147  Id. at 222. 
148  See id. at 219; see also discussion supra Part I. 
149  See Main, supra note 146, at 222. 
150  See Price, supra note 11, at 1005–06 (“But other definitions of familiar but context-
dependent terms impose unexpected restrictions on the scope of word meaning.”). 
151  18 U.S.C. § 2320(f)(5) (2012) (“[T]he term ‘traffic’ means to transport, transfer, or oth-
erwise dispose of, to another, for purposes of commercial advantage or private financial 
gain, or to make, import, export, obtain control of, or possess, with intent to so transport, 
transfer, or otherwise dispose of”). In this example, “traffic” is used in a sense far different 
than “traffic violation.” 49 U.S.C. § 31301 (2012). This is similar to how AI was defined for 
autonomous cars. See Section III.B. 
152  See Section III.B. 
153  See Price, supra note 11, at 1026–51. 
154  Id. at 1026 (“Statutory definitions even more emphatically illustrate the two levels on 
which legal language operates. On the one hand, statutory definitions tell us what terms 
mean in particular contexts; they are meant to clarify the message conveyed by the legisla-
ture in the statute’s normative clauses.”). 
155  Id. at 1027 (“On the other hand, legislative definitions can also empower; they may con-
fer a particular status on individuals, entities, or situations, and invest those agents and states 
of affairs with obligations, benefits, privileges, and rights.”). 
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two functions are critical for understanding how “AI” should be statutorily de-
fined. The particular issue when keeping such functions in mind is that “our 
language is built by its speakers,” and so meanings change overtime as people 
use terms.156 Compare how AI was being used to play chess as opposed to 
where AI is now—no longer following an algorithm but making its own deci-
sions.157 Another reason for clarity and precision in statutory definitions is due 
process.158 A law must be clear enough to be easily understandable by every 
citizen to ensure it is just,159 and with the conflation of different types of sys-
tems, it could be difficult to identify one’s legal status, responsibility, or expo-
sure. Hence, it is all about proving context to eradicate ambiguity,160 and there 
is plenty of ambiguity in technology, let alone with intelligent systems. 
Altogether, defining terms without a valid and well-identified intention 
risks complication.161 “[D]efinition[s] can provide information and direction on 
how a particular term is to be understood.”162 No matter the purpose, defini-
tions ought to be simple and succinct.163 The defining process is never com-
plete, and unforeseen situations and changes are inevitable. Thus, it is especial-
ly important to devise cogent definitions for terms which describe subjects that 
are continuously evolving.164 Even if there is no static definition for AI, “it 
ought to simplify clarify the legislative intention.”165 The determination must 
be made whether it is a prescriptive or descriptive definition, in order to deter-
mine the definition’s scope. Thus, it is critical for the judiciary and legislative 
branches to formulate the definition specific. 
                                                        
156  Id. at 1031 (“Underlying nearly all discussions of language and communication is the 
idea of community. Our language is built by its speakers.”); see also Peter R.A. Gray, The 
Language of Statutes: Laws and Their Interpretation: Lawrence M. Solan (2010), 19 INT’L J. 
SPEECH, LANGUAGE & L. 135, 139 (2012) (book review). 
157  See Section II.A–II.C. 
158  See Price, supra note 11, at 1031 (“Due process considerations certainly require that 
generally applicable statutes should have a meaning that is clear ‘enough’ to those to whom 
it applies.”). 
159  Id. 
160  Id. (“Context’s role in clarifying meaning is obvious: context allows disambiguation 
. . . .”). 
161  Id. at 1051 (“Defining without a valid and well-identified purpose risks complicating the 
statute and creating the potential for unforeseen questions unrelated to the statute’s pur-
pose.”). 
162  Id. at 1052. 
163  Id. (“No matter what purposes it serves, however, the definition ought to be simple and 
succinct in its statement.”). 
164  Id. at 1053 (“[T]he legislative drafter would do well to realize that definition is a process 
that is always incomplete.”). 
165  Id. 
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A.  Ambiguity & Descriptors 
Statutes commonly define ordinary terms that could be ambiguous.166 In 
“Wagging, Not Barking: Statutory Definitions,” by Jeanine Frazier Price, Pro-
fessor Price outlines two modes of defining terms: ambiguous terms and de-
scriptor terms,167 both of which are applicable to artificial intelligence. Ambig-
uous terms, such as “artificial intelligence,” have a scope issue, and the point of 
a statutory definition is to pick out or stipulate which of the many definitions 
apply.168 However, when a term functions as descriptor, it refers to a group or 
set that shares well-recognized characteristics (for example, “child” does not 
pick out one thing, but rather a group that resembles one another).169 This dis-
tinction between ambiguous types and descriptor types is important. Ambigu-
ous terms have one referent. Conversely, descriptor terms have more than one 
referent sharing common characteristics, rather than the term itself.170 
Applying this distinction to “artificial intelligence” is critical because it ei-
ther has one referent, what artificial intelligence actually is, or the shared char-
acteristics for everything called “artificial intelligence.” Though the latter still 
requires those characteristics to be defined, it can explain why many different 
things are commonly referred to as “artificial intelligence.” However, there are 
ways to attempt to define these types of terms.171 One option for a definition is 
to list what is included in the scope.172 For example, “livestock” is defined as 
“cattle, swine, and lambs.”173 This mode of defining is helpful in outlining what 
specifically falls under a given definition. Here, the definition has the option of 
listing off systems, software, programs, or modes of computer functions that 
qualify as “artificial intelligence.” This would be a descriptive definition, as 
opposed to a prescriptive definition that focuses on key characteristics or fea-
tures that are present in all artificial systems. Both methods can be suitable for 
defining artificial intelligence so long as the drafters have an understanding of 
the characteristics of artificial intelligence, and the distinction between strong 
AI and weak AI. 
                                                        
166  Id. at 1005 (“Sometimes those definitions clarify what sense of the word is intended, and 
place limits on the term’s application for purposes of the statute.”). 
167  Id. at 1006–07. 
168  Id. at 1005–07; see also discussion supra Parts I–II. 
169  See Price, supra note 11, at 1007. 
170  See id. 
171  See id. at 1010–11. 
172  See id. at 1010. 
173  See 7 U.S.C. § 1635a (5) (2012). 
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B. Descriptive Definition 
Descriptive definitions describe a term in a way that typically reflects “the 
actual use of [the] word or phrase.”174 The list could include radically different 
things, but they are unified by common characteristics. For example, “nuclear 
science” is defined as including “(1) nuclear science; (2) nuclear engineering; 
(3) nuclear chemistry; (4) radio chemistry; and (5) health physics.”175 It is pret-
ty obvious by this definition that health physics is different than nuclear engi-
neering. Price argues that descriptive definitions create “fuzzy categories” in 
which they are not bound by necessary or sufficient conditions, but rather by 
the closeness of resemblance to the original instance.176 So for AI, this categor-
ical approach allows for its definitions to have loose conditions based on com-
mon characteristics.177 Thus, a descriptive definition for artificial intelligence 
would be a list of several uses of artificial intelligence, such as machine learn-
ing, natural language, virtual agents, and reactive machines.178 
For example, “artificial intelligence includes (1) Reactive machines, (2) 
Limited Memory machines, (3) Theory of Mind systems, and (4) Self-
awareness systems, or include other systems that utilize autonomous deep 
learning.” This definition would rely on the current scientific consensus of the 
existing types of AI systems, and the current existing types may not consider 
certain attributes. This is not inherently problematic, but it creates equality be-
tween different systems that have contrasting functions and different levels of 
autonomy. 
Furthermore, this method has a few problems. One major problem is that 
this method shifts to the debate to which systems count as AI systems. Second, 
the “fuzzy category” allows for argumentation, which may not necessarily be a 
bad thing, but it is less definitive. Although this might complicate the legisla-
ture’s work, it does allow for there to be a clear distinction between strong AI 
and weak AI, and thus, this method has some merit. 
                                                        
174  Price, supra note 11, at 1010–11 (“Descriptive definitions, not surprisingly, describe the 
meaning of a term. And, that description usually reflects or depends upon the actual use of a 
word or phrase, although the definition itself may enlarge or contract ordinary usage.”). 
175  42 U.S.C. § 16532 (2012). 
176  Price, supra note 11, at 1011 (“Descriptive definitions often depict either a cluster of at-
tributes of what is defined or typical uses of the term.”). 
177  Id. (“That definition could encompass radically different objects and instances . . . but 
each of those instances share some characteristics . . .”). 
178  Arend Hintze, Understanding the Four Types of Artificial Intelligence, GOV’T TECH. 
(Nov. 14, 2016), http://www.govtech.com/computing/Understanding-the-Four-Types-of-Arti 
ficial-Intelligence.html [https://perma.cc/WT6R-LC64]; see also RUSSELL & NORVIG, supra 
note 56, at 2–3. 
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C.  Prescriptive Definition 
Comparatively, prescriptive definitions can outline a set of necessary con-
ditions that must be satisfied to fall within the scope of the definition.179 For 
example, the definition of “aircraft” outlines necessary conditions that must all 
be satisfied in order to be an aircraft: it must be “a civil, military, or public con-
trivance invented, used, or designed to navigate, fly, or travel in the air.”180 
This definition outlines several necessary conditions that must be satisfied to 
qualify as an aircraft, albeit with multiple ways to satisfy each condition. Pre-
scriptive definitions are precise but rely on the designation of essential charac-
teristics, which can establish features that distinguish members of the set.181 
Artificial intelligence would then be defined by its characteristics (such as 
those mentioned above) and could specifically outline two separate definitions 
for strong AI and weak AI.182 Using this method, a definition for strong AI 
might look like: “artificial intelligence is a system, program, software, or algo-
rithm that acts autonomously to think rationally, think humanely, act rationally, 
act humanely, make decisions, or provide outputs.”183 To change this definition 
to a weak AI definition, the words “acts autonomously” can be substituted for 
something similar such as “follows instructions.” This method allows for a def-
inition with some flexibility to include various or key characteristics; however, 
the list relies on determining the appropriate set of characteristics. 
These two methods offer different benefits for the term or phrase in ques-
tion.184 For terms with multiple meanings, descriptive definitions can specify 
which sense applies, but this can change the meaning by what is included or 
excluded.185 The definition is going to be under-or over-inclusive,186 and this 
creates an additional consideration when determining whether prescriptive or 
descriptive methods should be used.187 Clearly these are not the only two meth-
ods of creating statutory definitions, but they are two methods that are condu-
cive to defining complex terms. Either of these methods accomplish the goal of 
subjecting the definition of “AI” to normative rules,188 and having a precise 
                                                        
179  See Price, supra note 11, at 1012 (“Prescriptive definitions may consist of a set of condi-
tions, compliance with each one of which is necessary to fall within the definition’s scope 
. . . .”). 
180  18 U.S.C § 31(a)(1) (2012). 
181  See Price, supra note 11, at 1013 (“They may assign meaning to a term by designating a 
broader class and then establishing features that distinguish members of the defined term.”). 
182  See id. at 1009–13. 
183  See supra Section II.A–II.B. 
184  See Price, supra note 11, at 1013–15. 
185  Id. at 1015 (“For terms of many meanings, descriptive definitions can quickly and effi-
ciently indicate which sense of the word or phrase applies.”). 
186  See Scherer, supra note 5, at 373. 
187  See Price, supra note 11, at 1010–17. 
188  Id. at 1018 (“Falling within a statutory definition results in becoming subject to norma-
tive rules.”). 
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definition can narrow uncertainty as well as promote predictability.189 Either of 
these methods can accomplish the goal of removing ambiguity and making a 
statutory distinction between strong AI and weak AI. Thus, the definition can 
account for the unique characteristics of a new technology. 
CONCLUSION 
Despite the lack of consensus as to what artificial intelligence is, it is being 
developed at an alarming rate and will without a doubt be one of the world’s 
most significant developments.190 There is going to be a legal vacuum within 
the next decade or two where courts and legislatures will struggle to get a han-
dle on how to deal with AI.191 Rather than being reactive, courts, legislatures, 
or any legal body for that matter, will be better off navigating these new waters 
with some guidance from a statutory definition. 
However, these new waters are going to be best traversed if we understand 
the distinction between autonomous systems and systems following a given al-
gorithm or specified procedure. Current definitions only seem to regulate and 
portray an understanding of weak AI. Typically, because technological ad-
vancements are unforeseeable to a certain extent, and because most regulations 
are put in place after problems arise, definitions clarifying these advancements 
will come after. But with AI, the advancement—at least to the development of 
autonomy—is foreseeable. This autonomy will accelerate the development of 
AI and autonomy at a staggering rate.192 
We will greatly benefit from systems that are able to operate outside of our 
input and free from our human biases. Artificial intelligence will undoubtedly 
move in the direction of autonomy exclusive of humans because computers are 
just better at making decisions than people.193 Of course arguments can be 
made about whether or not these decisions should be left to machines; however, 
with proper regulation and statutory guidelines, we can at least understand how 
the current technology is different than past technology. Nevertheless, people 
will happily allow an AI system to diagnose them if it means surviving, or hap-
pily embrace an investment system able to make them money. Companies are 
                                                        
189  See REED DICKERSON, THE FUNDAMENTALS OF LEGAL DRAFTING 145 (2d ed. 1986). 
190  See supra Part I. 
191  See Scherer, supra note 5, at 391–92. 
192  Louis Columbus, 10 Charts That Will Change Your Perspective on Artificial Intelli-
gence’s Growth, FORBES (Jan. 12, 2018, 1:55 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/louiscolum 
bus/2018/01/12/10-charts-that-will-change-your-perspective-on-artificial-intelligences-growt 
h/#ed8f65947583 [https://perma.cc/TKH5-6QDU]; The Evolution of Artificial Intelligence: 
AI’s Coming of Age, UBS, https://www.ubs.com/microsites/artificial-intelligence/en/ai-comi 
ng-age.html [https://perma.cc/9R9A-YNGF] (last visited Mar. 16, 2019); see also supra 
Parts I–II. 
193  Lance Whitney, Are Computers Already Smarter Than Humans?, TIME (Sept. 29, 2017), 
http://time.com/4960778/computers-smarter-than-humans/ [https://perma.cc/7FJU-6UAB]; 
see also supra Part I. 
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already investing billions of dollars in this industry, and rather than being reac-
tive to the situations and consequences that arise, it is far better to be prepared 
for the inevitable legal, legislative, and judiciary discussions to come. One way 
to do this is by having a legal definition for “AI” to untangle the current ubiqui-
tous use of the phrase now. 
The definition needs to make clear the distinction between strong AI and 
weak AI, as different legal questions arise out of the distinction.194 These defi-
nitions can be done for particular applications, such as the Nevada statute for 
driverless cars.195 However, a general definition that could be applied across 
multiple applications could be beneficial so long as the distinction between 
strong AI and weak AI is understood, even if they end up being treated similar-
ly. Nevertheless, the definitions need to be flexible because of expansive and 
innumerable ways in which artificial intelligence can be utilized.196 The mean-
ings of words are determined by use,197 and one word can have multiple mean-
ings; further, meanings can change over time.198 “Artificial intelligence” al-
ready has a lot of uses, and it is necessary for the legal field to stipulate a 
workable definition in order to save itself time and resources. “New ideas and 
concepts spawn new words,”199 and AI is a field that will undergo rapid and 
exponential advancement, even beyond what we can consider now. This is why 
there needs to be language in place to handle this influx. However, ambiguity 
and vagueness are inescapable; so, a definition must be revisited whenever nec-
essary, and specifically with this type of advancement, revising the language 
should happen often.200 Because cases can turn on the definition of a term, 
courts need to settle on a definition and give it legal weight and authority.201 I 
have offered some examples of definitions, and I do not pretend to think they 
are anywhere near perfect; however, they demonstrate how one could write def-
initions that can account for autonomous machines. 
Once again, I am not saying that the law needs to treat strong AI and weak 
AI differently, just that the distinction needs to be understood because they are 
in fact very distinct from one another. To go back to the parent-child analogy, 
we legally treat minors differently than adults.202 It did not have to be this way, 
there could be a world where minors are just as legally accountable as adults, 
but we understand how minors, and if taken to the extreme, how babies, are not 
                                                        
194  See discussion supra Section II.D. 
195  See supra Section III.B. 
196  See discussion supra Parts I, IV. 
197  Main, supra note 146, at 228 (“These terms are defined so that we can use them in later 
parts to explore the overlap and interaction of meanings that result when different legal sys-
tems use the same words.”). 
198  Id. at 230–31. 
199  Id. at 231. 
200  See id. at 234. 
201  Id. at 233–34 (“Social conventions recognize and accept judicial authority to declare the 
meaning of words, albeit for a limited purpose and for a particular discourse community.”). 
202  See Cunningham, supra note 116, at 277–78. 
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autonomous, and thus we should treat them differently. We could only do this 
if we understand the difference in intelligence between someone who is adult 
and someone who is a minor. The United States draws its line in the sand at 18 
years of age, and I draw the line in the sand at autonomy.203 
An upcoming machine age is on its way and it will be led by AI.204 This 
technology will change the world, and that means the legal profession should 
be ready and prepared to account for those changes. There are two outcomes 
from AI, a utopian one and a dystopian one.205 Either the plot of Terminator 
unfolds, or we learn to live with machines and respect their artificial capaci-
ties.206 Depending on our understanding and capabilities to deal with AI, legal 
or otherwise, we can hope to achieve the better of the two outcomes. 
                                                        
203  I understand that my line is not a bright red one, but I think that could have its benefits 
and allow for some malleability, just as sometimes the United States charges children as 
adults. See Nicole Scialabba, Should Juveniles Be Changed as Adults in the Criminal Justice 
System?, A.B.A. (Oct. 3, 2016), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/litigation/committees/c 
hildrens-rights/articles/2016/should-juveniles-be-charged-as-adults.html [https://perma.cc/2S 
Y5-B2JC]. 
204  See BRYNJOLFSSON & MCAFEE, supra note 81, at 256. 
205  Id. at 254. 
206  Id. at 255. 
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